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ABSTRACT
The Market Share Theorem of Bell, Keeney, and Little is extended
to some situations where attractiveness ratings of products are not related
"linearly" and symmetrically to their market shares. Unique expressions
for market share are obtained in these contexts under an axiomatic structure
with three postulates, one fewer than used in the original theorem.
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More on a Market Share Theorem
Bell, Keeney, and Littlel recently proved a market share theorem.
They assumed that the sales potential of each product in a market can be
summarized by one "attractiveness" number, and postulated several
relationships between attractiveness ratings and market share. Then
they proceeded to show that, in their model, a seller's proportion of
total sales is simply the attractiveness of his product divided by the
total attractiveness of all products in the market.
The authors noted that linear-normalized "us/(us + them)"
expressions for market share are often hypothesized in the literature,
and that one value of their result is its specification of conditions
when such formulas are appropriate. But beyond ratifying expressions
that have already been assumed, the theorem has a prescriptive value.
Suppose one has a set of mathematical functions of product attributes--
one for each competitor in a market--that one believes related to the
market shares of individual firms by the Bell-Keeney-Little (hereafter
BKL) postulates. Then using linear-normalized estimates for percentage
distribution of sales is not only permissible under the theorem but
is mandatory because of it. Certain broad assumptions about market
behavior, when taken together, are surprisingly precise in their implications.
Because of the stringent conditions in the BKL axioms, the
result is directly applicable only in limited circumstances. This paper
describes an attempt to extend the market share theorem by dropping its
assumptions of "symmetry" and "linearity" in favor of more general
axioms. Using arguments that rest ultimately on the BKL theorem
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itself, we obtain unique expressions for market shares in the wider
framework considered. These results, hopefully, may make the market
share theorem more accessible to those wishing to use it.
The BKL Model
Associated with the n products in a particular market is an
attractiveness vector a = (al,...,an), where ai is the attractiveness
of product i. BKL assume that the components of the attractiveness
vector are governed and related to those of the market-share vector
(ml,...,mn) by the following rules:
n
1) ai > 0 for all i; E ai > .
i=l
2) If ai = O, mi = 0.
3) If ai aj, mi =mj.
4) Let Amij(6)a _ the change in market share
mi of product i associated with a change in attractiveness
vector from a to (al, a2,...aj+6, an).
Then for all j,kfi and all A, Amij( 6)a = Amik(6)a.
Under these conditions, BKL proved that
ai
m - (ml,m 2,...,mn) where m i = (i=l,..,n)
n
Z a.
j=l
is the only possible market-share vector.
To use this theorem in an actual situation the model builder
must construct--from vectors about price, advertising, quality, etc.--
an attractiveness vector that satisfies the four postulates. In general
III
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this is a nontrivial task. Postulate 4 is in some sense the most
"demanding" of the axioms: it specifies that a change 6 in another
product's attractiveness affects a firm's market-share the same way
regardless of which competitor sustained the change. (BKL called this
"symmetry"). Furthermore, attractiveness changes enter this axiom
only on an absolute scale ("linearity"). Thus, while an increment of
6 can mean much greater percentage growth in attractiveness for some
products than for others, this is treated as irrelevant. The market
analyst may well find that many would-be attractiveness vectors that
occur to him are tainted in practice by nonlinearity and asymmetry.
He may also have problems with Postulate 3's requirement that equal
attractiveness for two different products must mean equal market shares.
Modifying the BKL Postulates
Possible difficulties in using the BKL postulates as they
stand lead to an obvious question: can the axiomatic structure be
amended so that it is (1) flexible enough to accommodate asymmetry and
nonlinearity in the relationship between attractiveness and market
shares yet (2) sufficiently rigid to insure a unique market share vector
for a given attractiveness vector. We proceed now to investigate
this question. We first consider a system of axioms of no great
significance in itself, but important because it is a prototype of
a large class of asymmetric models. This particular system is highly
amenable to mathematical analysis and makes the crucial issues transparent.
As will be shown, the results obtained for the model used can be easily
generalized.
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We assume a market of exactly three products and an attractiveness
vector a = (al, a2, a3) assembled from basic marketing variables. It is
asserted that the following axioms describe the market's operation:
3
1) a i > O, E a i > 0.
i=1
2) ai = 0 * mi = 0.
3) ai aj m i = mj.
4A) For all a = (al, a2, a3),
i) A12(6)a = A13 (26)a
ii) A21( 6)a = A23(2) a
iii) =31(6)a = 3 2(6)a (in the earlier notation).
In words, statement 4A(i) means that, starting from a given
a, the impact on m of an attractiveness change for product 2 is the
same as that for twice as large a change in product 3's attractiveness.
(ii) means that m2 is in a similar way more "responsive" to changes
in a than a3, while (iii) indicates that the "elasticity" of m3 is the
same with respect to al and a2. (i) and (ii) bring asymmetry into the
model; we have not yet, however, introduced nonlinearity.
The question at issue is: can we express ml, m2 and m3 as
well-defined functions of (a1, a2, a3) under this set of postulates?
Before proceeding, we might attempt to motivate an expedition
into asymmetry. A hypothetical example where the new postulate 4
might conceivably fit is the public transportation market between two
nearby cities, served by two bus companies and a railroad line. One
might devise an attractiveness function for each carrier based on ticket
-rr_------
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prices, frequency of service, amount of advertising etc. Yet in some
sense the two bus lines may compete more directly against each other than
against the railroad trains, and the asymmetry of axioms such as 4A(i)
and 4A(ii) may adequately allow for this. One might argue that the intro-
duction of some "bus or train" variable into the attractiveness functions
might be sufficient to put things in the BKL framework. But there is
something metaphysical about such variables; it may well be preferable
to deal with attractiveness vectors based on well-defined quantities
even if they entail asymmetry.
Trouble Develops
While the new postulates above are not fettered by symmetry,
there is another problem. The attempts to find market share functions
that satisfy axioms 1-4A is doomed to failure, as we shall show presently.
It is important to note that ml(al, a2, a3) can be written as
ml(al, 2a2+a3) (i.e., product l's market share depends on a2 and a3
only through the weighted sum 2a2+a3.) To see this, we consider two
consecutive changes in the attractiveness vector: (1) product 2's
attractiveness increases by A, (2) product 2's attractiveness decreases
by A. Obviously these two changes have no net affect on ml. If the
second alteration in the attractiveness vector were instead a decrease
of 2A in a3, axiom 4A tells us that ml would likewise sustain no net change.
Thus whenever a2 and a3 change in such a way that Aa3 = -2Aa2 or, equiva-
lently, that 2a2+a3 remains constant, m remains constant unless
a varies. Therefore, m 1 can be considered a function of the two variables
al and 2a2+a3. Similarly, we can write m2(a2, 2al+a 3) and m3 (a3, al+a2).
... . . I .. I I I . .1 , , 1
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We now examine five specific attractiveness vectors (al, a2, a3)
and reach an odd conclusion about market shares:
1) a = y, a2 = 0, a3 = y for some positive y.
From axiom 2, m2 = 0 here; from 3 and the obvious requirement
3
that E mi = 1, ml = m3 = .5. Since al, a3, 2a2+a3, and a1+a2 all
i=l
equal y , we see that ml(y, y) = m3(y, y) = .5.
2) a = y, a2 = .5y, a3 = O.
ml(a1, 2al+a2) = ml(Y, y) = .5 from the previous result. Since
m3 = 0 here, we can conclude that m2(a2, 2al+a3) = m2(.5y, 2y) = .5.
In a wholly analogous way, examination of the attractiveness vec-
tors 3:(0, y, y) and 4:(.5Y, y, O) leads to the conclusion ml(.5y, 2y) = .5.
5) a = .5y, a2 = .5y, a3 = y.
Note that 2al+a 3 = 2a2+a3 = 2y here, thus the facts that
3
ml1(.5y, 2y) = m2(.5y, 2y) = .5 and Z mi = 1 require that m3(a3, al+a2 ) =
i=l
m3(y, y) = O. But earlier we concluded that m3(y, y) = .5. What a
calamity has arisen--the axioms tell us that the third competitor has
both none of the sales and half of them! Our attempts to generalize
the BKL postulates can hardly at this point be described as successful.
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Picking Up the Pieces
A crude, qualitative explanation of what went wrong above
is in order. The contradiction we found is similar to that which would
arise if one tried calculating the slope of a straight line through
three points on a circle. In both problems, the conditions imposed
on the solution include some that cannot simultaneously be satisfied.
We have noted at length the asymmetric form of postulate 4A, but paid
too litle attention to the fact that axiom 3 (equal attractiveness
implies equal market share) is not only symmetric in structure but a
very strong requirement on all would-be market-share functions. The
underlying cause of trouble is that axioms 3 and 4A "clash" in their
implications in a fashion that cannot be reconciled by single-valued
expressions for mi(al, a2, a3).
To continue our effort to extend the BKL model, we must weaken
or delete one of the conflicting postulates. Since 4A is "cutting
edge" of the current attempt to find broader results, it is logical that
axiom 3 should be subject to change. The way we will handle postulate
3 is simply to eliminate it. This step removes the immediate cause of
stress, but whether the three axioms left specify a well-defined set
of mi(a1, a2, a3) is as yet unclear. With the aid of a surprising result,
we will see that they do.
With axiom 3 removed, the problem becomes that of finding
market-share functions (mi) consistent with the rules
3
1) a i > , z ai > 0.
i=l
Ir
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2) ai = 0 * mi 0.
4A)* i) A12a(6) = A13a(26)
ii) A21a(6) = A23a(2)
iii) A3 1a ( ) = A32a ()
* We will retain the original numbering of the postulates
to avoid confusion.
It is no longer the case that there are no mi(al, a2, a3)
(i=l, 2, 3) satisfying the axioms and the requirement that
3
Z mi =1. Indeed, there is now a linear-normalized solution:
i=l
2al
m1 = 2al + 2a 2 + a3 '
2a2
m2 = 2a1 + 2a2 + a3
a3
m3 = 2a 1 + 2a2 + a3
There is a danger, however, that we have so "weakened" the axiomatic
structure that there are many, possibly even an infinite number, of
well-defined sets of m.'s consistent with it. It is this possibility we
must now consider.
At this point we make a linear change of variables in the
components of the attractiveness vector. The new vector b = (b1, b2, b3)
is related to the original a = (al, a2, a3) by the relationships:
b = 2al, b2 = 2a2, b3 = a3. In the new system, axioms 1, 2 and 4A appear
as:
III
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3
1) bi > 0, bi > 0.
i=l
2) bi = 0 ~ mi = 0.
4B) Al2b( 6) = A13b(6)
A21b() A23b(6)
A31(6) = A32().31b 32b
Postulates 1 and 2 are unchanged but 4B, which is equivalent to the
former 4A, is no longer asymmetric; 4B is the same as postulate 4 in the
original BKL model. With the new attractiveness variables, therefore,
three of the four specifications made by BKL are satisfied. This is
only a curiosity in the absence of the other axiom (equal attractiveness
implies equal market share) UNLESS it could somehow be shown that the
three we already have imply the fourth; were that to happen, the Market
Share Theorem would be directly relevant to the current problem.
Strangely enough, postulates 1, 2 and 4B do imply the remaining axiom,
as we will show now.
Theorem: Suppose one has an attractiveness vector b = (bl, b2, b3)
and market-share functions mi(bl, b2, b3) satisfying rules 1,2, and 4B.
Then if bi = bj, mi = m.
Proof: Let b = x, b2 = x and b3 = z for any x and/or z > 0; we will
show here that ml(x, x, z) x2 ( , x, z). The argument is wholly
parallel when b1 = b3 or b2 = b3.
With the same reasoning used earlier (p. 5), we can extablish
that under postulate 4B, m depends on b2 and b3 only through their sum
"Y1----l-rm------Illsl-r·r·-----· I---- -------
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b2+b3, m2 depends on b and b3 only through bl+b3, and m3
depends on b and b2 only through bl+b2. (In this argument we will
write ml(bl, b2, b3) rather than ml(bl, b2+b3) etc. but will utilize
the property just described.) We demonstrate that m = m2 by considering
some other attractiveness vectors (bl, b2, b3).
a) Let b - x, b2 = 0, b3 = x+z. By 2, m2 = 0; let m3 (x, 0, x+z) - y.
Since b and b2+b 3 take the same values as at (x, x, z),
ml(x, 0, x+z) = m(x, x, z) = l-y.
b) Let b = 0, b2 = x, b3 = x+z. Here m = O; since bl+b2
andb3 retain their values in (a) m3(0, x, x+z) = y. Thus
m2(0, x, x+z) = l-y and therefore, since m2(0, x, x+z) =
m2(x, x, z), it follows that ml(x, x, z) = m2(x, x, z). Q.E.D.
The theorem just proved means that 1,2 and 4A imply all four
BKL conditions in the new variable system. But then
bi for i 1, 2, 3
i bl + b2 + b3
or, transforming back to the original variables,
2a1
2a1 + 2a2 + a3
2a2
2a1 + 2a2 + a3
a3
2a1 + 2a2 + a3
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is the only set of market-share functions consistent with 1, 2 and 'A.
Thus the elimination of axiom 3* created an asymmetric set of
postulates that did in fact prescribe a unique distribution of
percentage sales for a given attractiveness vector. The distribu-
tion of percentage sales for a given attractiveness vector. The
distribution itself was found through an appropriate application
of the Market Share Theorem. In the next section, we use the
insights obtained thus far to handle asymmetry and nonlinearity
in a more general setting.
More Nonlinearity and Asymmetry
We now consider the following model of market behavior. There
are N competing products (N > 3) and an attractiveness vector
(a1, a2 ,...,aN). Associated with each product i(i=l,...,N) is
a positive mathematical function hi(x) defined for all x > 0.
The relationships governing market share mi(ai ,... ,aN) (i=l,...,N)
and attractiveness are
N
1) ai > , E a i > 0.
i=l
2) ai = 0 mi = 0.
3A) mi(al,...,aN) is a differentiable function of each
aj(j=l,...,n) and for all K,L i, the following
equation is satisfied:
ami hK(a K ) mi
aa K hL(aL) aL
The key features of this model are contained in axion 3A.
* Note that 3 would NOT have become bi = bj mi = mj in the new system.
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the BKL problem and the example we used earlier, this formulation
explicitly assumes each mi differentiable in the attractiveness variables.
This is probably not a great practical restriction, especially since the
market share functions obtained in the previous problems turned out
to be differentiable. (There is a way to avoid a differentability
assumption in 3A but it is so cumbersome as not to seem worthwhile.)
The equation in 3A makes clear that the model is asymmetric since the
impact of a change in attractiveness depends in general on which
product sustains the change. And the factor
hK(aK)
hL(aL)
relates the significance of changing a product's attractiveness directly
to its current level, introducing-for the first time--the element of
nonlinearity. The functions hi(x) indicate the "elasticit'of a competitor's
market share in product i's attractiveness level, and allow different
assessments of market behavior for different products.
The major result of this paper is the following:
Theorem: Under axioms 1 - 3A,
b'hi(x)dx
mi(al,...,aN)' = N a. uniquely.
Z j h (x)dx
j=o 3
Proof: As before, we introduce a change of attractiveness variables.
aj
Let b. hj(x)dx. Then equivalent to postulates 1,2 and 3A are
the rules:
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N
1) b i > , Z b i > 0.
i=l
2) bi -0 mi = 0.
3B) ami 3mi
-b abb for all K, Z i.
Rule 2 follows at once from the previous rule 2 and the definition
of bi; rule 1 is an immediate consequence of its antecedent in (al,...,aN)
and the assumption that all hi(x)'s are positive functions. (3B)
results from (3A) and the observation that
am i am i db. ami
3aj - abj da j = mhj(a)
A moment's reflection makes apparent that 3B is the "differentiable"
equivalent to BKL postulate 4. Thus BKL axioms 1,2 and 4 are satisfied
under the new attractiveness variables; since, as we have seen, 1,2 and 4
imply BKL axiom 3, we can use the Market Share Theorem to state that
bi
mi - N
bj
J=-1
Rewriting mi in terms of (al,...,aN) yields the theorem.
What we have done here is consider a special set of nonlinear
and asymmetric situations that can be transformed into linear symmetric
problems with relatively simple changes of variables. However, the
generality in the functional forms of the hi(x)'s allows a number of
potentially practical cases to fall into this set.
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Example
Consider a three-product market with a non-negative attractiveness
measure for each competitor. Suppose one believes that zero attractiveness
implies no sales, and that the sensitivity of market share to attractive-
ness is described by the differential equations:
am1 "'1 + a2 3m1
aa2 1+ 3 a 3
aa1 1 + 3 a 3
am3 / +a a m3
aa 1 J 1 + a2 aa 2
= h2(x) = /1x and h3(x) = l+x, the result
ai
g hi(X)dx
_, ~ 3 a .
mi - 3a.
E f hj(x)dx
j =10
becomes:
ml(al, a2 , a3 ) =
m2(a1 , a2, a3) =
m3 (a1 , a2, a3) =
just proved
2/3((1 + a1 ) -3/2 1)
3/2 3/2 2
2/3((1 + al) + (1 + a2) - 2) + a3 + a3/2
3/2
2/3((1 + a2) - 1)
3/2 3/2 2
2/3((1 + a) + (1 + a2)) + a3 + a3/2
a3 + a3/2
., 
2/3((1 + a )3/2 +1 (1 + a2)3/2 2) + a + a3/2
Since hl(x)
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1) bi ' 0, E bi > 0.
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3B) ami ami
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of bi; rule 1 is an immediate consequence of its antecedent in (al,...,aN)
and the assumption that all hi(x)'s are positive functions. (3B)
results from (3A) and the observation that
ami ami db. am
abj daj = (a a 
A moment's reflection makes apparent that 3B is the "differentiable"
equivalent to BKL postulate 4. Thus BKL axioms 1,2 and 4 are satisfied
under the new attractiveness variables; since, as we have seen, 1,2 and 4
imply BKL axiom 3, we can use the Market Share Theorem to state that
b i
mi N
bj
Rewriting m. in terms of (al,...,aN) yields the theorem.
What we have done here is consider a special set of nonlinear
and asymmetric situations that can be transformed into linear symmetric
problems with relatively simple changes of variables. However, the
generality in the functional forms of the hi(x)'s allows a number of
potentially practical cases to fall into this set.
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Example
Consider a three-product market with a non-negative attractiveness
measure for each competitor. Suppose one believes that zero attractiveness
implies no sales, and that the sensitivity of market share to attractive-
ness is described by the differential equations:
aml V1 + a2 ml1
aa 2 1 + aa 3
am2 /1 + a a am2
aal 1 + a3 aa3
am3 / + a m3
aal 1 +a1 + aa 2
Since h(x) - h2(x) = /x and h3(x) = l+x, the result
ai
g hi(x)dx
m i :,-, 3 a.
Z f hj(x)dx
j=10
becomes:
just proved
ml(al, a2 , a3)
m2 (a1, a2, a3 )
3/2
2/3((1 + a)3/2 - 1)
2/3((1 + a)3/2 + (1 + a2)
3/2
2/3((1 + a2) - 1)
2/3((1 + a ) + (1 + a2)
2
- 2) + a3 + a3/2
2
- 2) + a3 + a3/2
m 3 (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 )
2 2
a3 + a 3 /2
2/3(( + al)3/2 + (1 + a2)3/2 2) + a + a/22 3
111
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In this particular model, the "elasticity" ami/3ai market
shares for products 1 and 2 goes up, roughly speaking, with ai
while product 3's "elasticity" varies with (a3) 2. When might
such a situation actually arise? Suppose current advertising expen-
ditures seem appropriate as major components of the attractiveness
numbers. If products 1 and 2 have been on the market somewhat
shorter than their competitor, the model-builder might believe a
weaker "law of diminishing returns" applies to these products than to
3. In some cases the equations above might quantify that notion
adequately. Note that when a2 = a3
m1 > am1 (except when a2 = a3 = 0); similarly
aa 3 aa 2
am2 > am2 when a = a > O.
a3 a1 
This indicates that, other factors being equal, products 1 and 2
compete more directly with product 3 than with each other. We
discussed earlier a circumstance where such asymmetric competition
might occur (2 bus lines, 1 rail line).
.imaaar-----.Qsranr...___--l-
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Conclusions
The results here should be viewed not as generalizations of the
Market Share Theorem but rather elaborations of it. Direct use of the
Bell-Keeney-Little theorem requires an attractiveness vector related
linearly and symmetrically to the vector of market-shares. We have obtained
results in some asymmetric, nonlinear situations through making variable
changes that led to the BKL framework. Our work was greatly facilitated
by the finding that the axiom "equal attractiveness implies equal market
share" was not essential to reaching the BKL result; this meant that
no corresponding postulate was needed in the systems we considered. As
we saw, direct imposition of that axiom upon an asymmetric system led
to contradictory and meaningless results.
Our findings mean that the Market Share Theorem is of even
broader relevance than one might at first realize. Hopefully those
trying to understand market behavior will find this information useful.
ll
·,,,
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